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Abstract 
This paper challenges the UN Security Council’s approach to women, peace and security 
through a detailed analysis of participation initiatives in the eight resolutions on women, 
peace and security, alongside study of the recent shift to include countering terrorism and 
violent extremism provisions in resolution 2242. Through review of a range of feminist 
approaches that remain ‘outside’ the strategies leading institutional gender perspectives I 
scrutinise the shifts across the resolutions on women, peace and security. In particular, this 
article analyses how Security Council resolution 2242, produced after the High-Level Report 
studying the fifteen years after resolution 1325, includes important developments in the 
articulation of participation. However, the risk of progressing work on women, peace and 
security within global structures without attention to the diversity of women’s needs, lives 
and experiences drawn from a feminist commitment to anti-militarism and postcolonial 
listening is likely to produce a series of regressive outcomes that perpetuate victim 
feminisms and which fail to dislodge the intersection of gender with colonial and racial 
power structures within global institutions. 
Key Words feminist approaches; women, peace and security; participation; Security 
Council; counter-terrorism Introduction
Feminist approaches to security draw from a history of feminist activism and scholarship that 
include peace protests, anti-militarisation1 and, more recently, postcolonial approaches.2 
Nevertheless, the UN Security Council remains selective with regard to which conflicts and 
which women’s or feminist views it responds to through its work. In this paper I argue, that 
despite the origins of the women, peace and security agenda in the work of the Women’s 
League for International Peace and Freedom (WILPF), the Security Council remains resistant 
to feminist histories of peace activism as well as scholarship that engage critical and 
postcolonial feminist lens to address security. To demonstrate this, I question the corpus of 
Security Council resolutions on women, peace and security and interrogate at what cost 
recent perceived gains in the most recent resolution might have been achieved through. The 
research examines the advances and restraints with regard to the participation components of 
the resolutions as a means to assess the ways feminist actors might use the women, peace and 
security framework in the future. 
To reflect critically on the role of feminist approaches within a global institution, such as the 
Security Council, I examine all eight resolutions on women, peace and security with 
particular attention on resolution 2242. On October 13th 2015 the United Nations Security 
Council issued its eighth resolution on women, peace and security, Resolution 2242. While 
Resolution 2242 appears to respond to some of the criticisms of the earlier resolutions3 
questions remain about the continued production of Security Council resolutions as a space of 
gender law reform.4  New developments within resolution 2242 include an expansion in the 
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framing of women’s participation, new implementation initiatives and the use of the women, 
peace and security framework in co-ordination with the counter-terrorism agenda. Despite 
these additions, the silence on the Security Council’s expanding authorisations of military 
force and the complicity of United Nations peacekeeping operations in sexual exploitation 
and abuse raises questions about the women, peace and security framework as a whole. In 
addition, the linkage of the women, peace and security agenda with the countering terrorism 
and violent extremism underlines the reality that the Security Council cannot and does not 
function as a space of feminist law making. 
In examining the manner in which the Security Council develops provisions on participation I 
develop a critique of the dominance of liberal and radical feminist accounts that are 
prominent in the women, peace and security framework calling, instead, for attention to the 
manner in which women’s difference is constituted, how gender is implicated in broader 
power relationships and the sustained intersectional privileges produced within international 
institutional outputs. Unlike much scholarship on women, peace and security, I focus less on 
Security Council resolution 1325 (31 October 2000) and take all eight resolutions as the focus 
for my analysis. This is in part driven by a desire to disrupt the dominant focus on either 
Security Council resolution 1325 exclusively or a focus on the four resolutions that address 
issues related to conflict related sexual violence without sufficient discussion of the relevance 
of the various approaches across all eight resolutions. As the Security Council has now issued 
eight resolutions on women, peace and security (four on conflict related sexual violence and 
four on broader issues under the women, peace and security framework) I regard the themes 
and developments, advances and limitations across the spectrum of resolutions as important. 
In reviewing Security Council resolution 2242 as an element of the larger women, peace and 
security framework I conclude that 2242 marks a change in terms of how the Security 
Council articulates requirements with respect to participation and this reflects the sustained, 
critical and informed feminist and gender work that is undertaken via the umbrella 
organisation of UN Women. Nevertheless, the institutional demands on the women, peace 
and security framework – driven by wider security approaches of the Security Council and its 
permanent members - continues to raise concerns about the long-term effectiveness of 
utilising the Security Council as a space for developing and implementing gender law reform. 
The article proceeds in the following manner. I begin with a review of how participation is 
articulated in Security Council resolutions 1325 through to 2122 and the feminist approaches 
reflected across the first seven resolutions. I follow with an analysis of resolution 2242 to 
reflect on the manner in which participation is articulated within this resolution, in particular 
through the (slowly) expanding recognition of women’s diversity and the need for the 
Security Council as well as the United Nations to also address women’s participation. The 
final section of the article raises alternative feminist approaches, beyond liberal and radical 
models, as tools to re-examine the outputs and potential of the twenty-first century turn to the 
Security Council as guardian of gender initiatives on collective security. In particular, I use a 
combination of Otto’s account of politically responsible listening as a feminist methodology5 
and Kapur’s postcolonial feminist analysis of peripheral subjects.6 
From Security Council resolution 1325 to 2122 
 
Resolution 1325 
 
Security Council resolution 1325 on women, peace and security is characterised as containing 
four pillars: protection, prevention, participation and relief and recovery. Innovative in terms 
of the manner in which it was initiated via a joint Security Council and women’s NGO 
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drafting process, the resolution is broad in its articulation of the interlinking concerns across 
the four pillars and demonstrates a commitment on the part of the Security Council to 
underscoring the nexus between women, peace and security in its wider work. In this section 
I focus on the participation pillar only, and compare the manner in which participation is 
articulated in Security Council resolution 1325 and the subsequent six resolutions 
(Resolutions 1820, 1888, 1889, 1960, 2106 and 2122). This allows me to focus on resolution 
2242 in the following section and address the trajectory of concerns in the Council’s 
approach to participation. I argue that it is in the participation pillar that the slow advance of 
gender law reform can be seen. 
The participation pillar in Security Council resolution 1325 is articulated in the first operative 
paragraph of the text, signally the overarching value and importance that increased 
representation of women at all levels of decision-making held for WILPF actors involved in 
drafting the resolution. As such, the opening paragraph of the resolution requires the 
increased participation of women in all decision-making – national, regional and international 
– and across security issues ‘for the prevention, management and resolution of conflict’.7 
 
This is supplemented by a request to the Secretary-General to increase women’s contributions 
to decision-making bodies in the United Nations, including as Special Representatives and 
envoys.8 In paragraph four the Security Council calls for an expansion of the role and 
contribution of women in United Nations field-missions, while throughout the resolution a 
commitment to incorporating gender perspectives and gender mainstreaming is articulated 
alongside the Security Council expressing its willingness, in paragraph 15, to develop 
consultations with local and international women’s groups. 
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Despite the range of initiatives within Security Council resolution 1325 that attended to the 
participation pillar of the women, peace and security framework it is paragraph one that is of 
(potentially) the greatest value, as this paragraph is directed at member states and instructs 
member states to develop these components of the resolution. Security Council resolution 
1325 specifically directs member states to act under paragraph one, calls on all parties to 
peace negotiations under paragraph seven, all parties to armed conflicts under paragraphs 
eight through to thirteen and otherwise addresses the Secretary-General or the Council itself. 
None of these provisions are drafted using mandatory language and thus remain soft (non- 
binding) law provisions. This is important as creates aspirational goals for member states, and 
other actors, with respect to women’s participation in all stages of conflict prevention and 
resolution. This remains the case for the seven subsequent resolutions. Nevertheless, the 
distinction between paragraph one, and the subsequent paragraphs in Security Council 
resolution 1325 that address participation, is found in the directive for states to act: as states 
remain the primary subjects under international law and, if the Security Council, were to 
exercise its law-making powers this would be through the imposition of legal obligations on 
states. In this sense paragraph one of the resolution is of specific importance from a law- 
making perspective and to this end the feminist approach that it embeds within the Security 
Council’s approach to women, peace and security should be regarded as of significant 
importance. 
Paragraph one of Security Council resolution 1325 focuses on increasing numbers/ 
representation of women at all levels (national, regional, international) signalling a liberal 
feminist approach of counting the women or, what might be referred to as, representative 
participation. Liberal feminist approaches identify and pursue formal equality goals, through 
embracing rights and equality measures within gender law reform. Although liberal 
feminisms have been relatively successful in ensuring gender equality within liberal legal 
frameworks, they have been criticised for failing to challenge the masculine framing of law 
and ignoring substantive inequality. It is paragraph one of resolution 1325, and its liberal 
framing of women’s participation, that is also reiterated in future resolutions, including in 
resolution 2242. Other studies have documented the small quantitative change that has 
resulted from these participation components.9 In addition to only very small changes in the 
number of women participating being documented over the life of resolution 1325, the focus 
of this provision, and the requirement for greater inclusion of women in formal decision 
making bodies, ultimately maintains a formal equality strategy that is largely aligned with the 
liberal feminist goal of increasing the numbers of women in decision making bodies. This 
might in and of itself be a valuable thing; however, this remains a very narrow feminist 
project that does not sufficiently account for women’s diversity or the types of factors that 
make political participation possible for some women and not others. Liberal feminist 
projects centre on the promotion of a liberal equality model that imagine the liberal subject as 
unencumbered and plays down the role of institutional and structural disadvantages. As a 
consequence, the promotion of representation of women without reflection on additional 
privileges that facilitate access to decision-making bodies represents a specific feminist 
agenda. Further work is required to avoid the reliance on the participation of elite women in 
international institutions; who often represent the same or similar groups as men who have 
access to decision making bodies. At an epistemological level, liberal feminist projects work 
from assumptions with regard to women’s sameness (within groups of women and with men) 
and ultimately re-inscribe problematic gender binaries. 
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Recognition of the promotion of a liberal feminist framework centred on increased 
representation highlights two underlying concerns that need to be broached when addressing 
women’s participation and inclusion within peace and security decision-making bodies. First, 
attention needs to be paid to how the diversity of feminist approaches can be accommodated 
within international institutions, if at all. Second, approaches need to develop sensitivity to 
the diversity of women, women’s needs and women’s experiences and to consider what 
possibilities exist for this to be reflected within international legal reforms. In the words of 
Gunaratnam and Hamilton, ‘a commitment to make feminism mean something . . . has 
continued to complicate and supplement the idea of a distinct feminist methodological 
imperative’.10 Liberal feminist approaches can thus be read as one approach amongst many, 
rather than the approach of feminism. For the purposes of this paper, attention to peripheral 
subjects,11 coloniality,12 and embodied subjectivity13 provide feminist theorising that seeks to 
address the assumed uniform feminist project within international spaces. In identifying 
peripheral subjects and positioning the views of those on the periphery as normatively equal 
in their assertion of needs and rights, Western feminist projects - such as liberal feminism - 
are challenged to re-consider and reflect on the biases and privilege that their positions on 
women, peace and security stem from. At the same time this begins from the lived 
experiences of those who feel the negative impact, or have felt the impact, of past 
international policies: on peace and security, on development and via international 
institutions. This also requires the Security Council to be attentive to which feminist and 
gender voices are permitted to speak within international institutions. 
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In response to the second concern, I propose a project of identifying the over-representation 
of men in institutional structures as a relevant and important starting point. This second 
strategy requires the women, peace and security framework to shift from the collapsing of the 
term gender to mean women, toward recognising men and women’s diverse, lived 
experiences and to theorise how gender is a power relationship that interlocks with other sites 
of privilege to create disadvantage, under representation and misrecognition of existing 
contributions. In particular, the answer to the second question (on women’s diversity) lies 
less in seeing gender as a site of identity (male or female, man or women) and rather as 
produced by institutional assumptions and frameworks that prioritise and reinforce a 
gendered normative order that both empowers and disempowers. In doing so a space that 
opens toward appreciating personhood might also be envisaged. 
Resolutions 1820, 1888, 1960 and 2106 
 
In addition to Security Council resolution 1325, women’s participation is addressed across 
the four resolutions on conflict related sexual violence. The resolutions – 1820, 1888, 1960 
and 2106 – represent the specific attention of the UK and US representatives in the Security 
Council who have taken the lead on resolutions and initiatives within the Security Council on 
matters with respect to conflict related sexual violence. Across these resolutions references to 
women’s participation are consistently circumscribed as necessary either to protect women 
from conflict related sexual violence or to add preventative measures. For example, Security 
Council resolution 1820 (19th June 2008) calls for, in paragraph eight, ‘wherever possible the 
deployment of a higher percentage of women peacekeepers and police’ as a preventative 
measure against the perpetration of conflict related sexual violence; in paragraph ten calls for 
consultation with women and women-led organisations to develop protection measures; and, 
in paragraph eleven, for consultations with women’s civil society groups during peace 
processes to find ways to address conflict related sexual violence.14 Likewise, Security 
Council resolution 1888 (30th September 2009) requires, in paragraph fourteen ‘interactive 
meetings with local women and women’s organisations’; in paragraph sixteen representation 
of women in mediation and decision-making processes; and, in paragraph nineteen, increased 
female military and police personal all with a view to preventing and representing conflict 
related sexual violence.15 
Security Council resolution 1960 (16th December 2010) also calls for greater numbers of 
female military and policing personal in United Nations missions and is otherwise silent on 
women’s participation, although it is in this resolution that Women’s Protection Advisors are 
created as a component of United Nations missions.16 Security Council resolution 2106 (24th 
June 2013) calls for more Women’s Protection Advisors and Gender Advisors in the field, 
and also addresses women’s participation as a means to enhance women’s protection from 
conflict related sexual violence, via paragraphs eleven, sixteen and twenty-one.17 
The sum of the conflict related sexual violence resolutions is to reduce the 1325 model of 
participation to women’s participation in peace and security matters as one driven by a need 
to address conflict related sexual violence. This is an unfortunate reduction of women’s 
participation to one that might be described as a protective participation model.18 The 
underlying feminist model, if any,19  that this might be described as derived from is that of US 
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forms of radical feminism: where women’s sexual vulnerability and subordination is regarded 
as the central site of women’s disempowerment and discrimination.20 Not only has this 
feminist approach been criticised as a developing a form of victim feminism within the 
international order21 and exporting a limited feminist model into the global order,22 the 
approach places conflict related sexual violence as the paradigmatic experience of women 
during armed conflict and may deflect attention from economic needs,23  gender-based 
violence and the role of gendered power relations in producing the myriad of gendered harms 
that communities experience. The approach also centres on an assumption that men outside of 
Western /powerful states are the primary perpetrators of sexual violence, while deflecting 
attention from the inadequacies of laws in peacetime states in prosecuting, preventing or 
creating protection from sexual violence. 
While sexual exploitation and abuse committed by UN personal is also addressed within 
these resolutions the following two assumptions are also carried through the four resolutions. 
First, that sexual exploitation and abuse is the irregular and exceptional behaviour of 
individual peacekeeping personal. Second, increased participation of women in peacekeeping 
operations is a means to reduce sexual exploitation and abuse. Combined these two 
assumptions appear to deny the role of military sexual cultures in the permissive approach 
peacekeeping communities have to sexual relations while on mission and place a double 
burden of female peacekeepers to undertake their professional roles and to police their male 
colleagues. 
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Resolutions 1889 and 2122 
 
The two additional Security Council resolutions on women, peace and security, resolution 
1889 (5th October 2009)24 and resolution 2122 (18th October 2013),25 add a model of 
substantive participation within the women, peace and security framework. Resolution 1889 
reiterates the call of 1325 for increased formal representation of women at all levels of 
decision-making in relation to conflict prevention, conflict resolution and peacebuilding but 
also, and significantly, acknowledges the substantive factors that hinder women’s access to 
participation and representation. Unfortunately, the key influence of Security Council 
resolution 1889 has been the shift to the use of indicators in United Nations missions as a 
mechanism to ‘measure’ the success of the women, peace and security framework. The use of 
indicators, which are never in and of themselves neutral or objective tools,26 risks a collapse 
into a project of counting the women rather than attention to the substantive and structural 
disadvantages that hinder women’s full participation within any community. In addition, 
resolution 1889 does not acknowledge the needs of diverse groups of women and how 
representation of some women within decision-making bodies will not necessarily address 
the needs of different women, in particular indigenous women, socially and economically 
disadvantaged women, women with health disadvantages and women within racial and ethnic 
minorities. Beyond this it is worth also noting that the resolutions as a whole more often 
emphasise the need for consultation with women’s groups, women’s civil society and 
women’s organisations rather than promoting women as decision makers or as members of 
decision-making groups. 
 
 
24 UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 1889 (2009) [on women and peace and security] , 5 October 
2009, S/RES/1889 (2009), available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/4acdd8512.html [accessed 21 July 2017] 
25  UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 2107 (2013) [on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait] , 
27 June 2013, S/RES/2107 (2013), available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/51d6b7894.html [accessed 21 
July 2017] 
26 Sally Engle Merry, “Measuring the World: Indicators, Human Rights and Global Governance”, Current 
Anthropology, Vol. 52, No. 3 (2011), pp. 583-595. 
Nevertheless, Security Council resolution 1889 should be recognised as commencing a model 
of substantive participation that significantly develops the model of formal representation in 
resolution 1325 and is a useful alternative to the protective participation articulated in the 
conflict-related sexual violence resolutions. Security Council resolution 1889 achieves the 
substantive approach through acknowledgement of factors that might hinder women’s access 
to participation, including in paragraph ten, where the Council ‘encourages Member States in 
post-conflict situations ... to address those needs and priorities, which cover inter alia support 
for greater physical security and better socio-economic conditions’, and in paragraph eleven 
‘urges Member States, United Nations bodies and civil society ... to take all feasible measures 
to ensure women and girls’ equal access to education in post-conflict situations, given the 
vital role of education in the promotion of women’s participation in post-conflict decision 
making’. This offers a substantial advance on the participation components of Security 
Resolution 1325 and the focus on liberal equality strategies, or representative participation, 
and the approach found in the resolutions centred on conflict-related sexual violence which 
address participation through a protective lens. 
Security Resolution 2122 further develops the participation components of the women, peace 
and security framework in two specific ways. First, resolution 2122 (briefly yet significantly) 
recognises the diversity of women in post-conflict spaces. While this is only brief in terms of 
inclusion it is important that the Security Council has begun to recognise the diverse needs of 
women. As such, in paragraph 7(a) this resolution potentially marks the beginning of a shift 
within Security Council work on gender perspectives to challenge gender essentialism. 
Although this is included in a somewhat minimal fashion, it is important to note that the 
language of consulting diverse groups of women’s groups to reflect the views of socially and 
economically disadvantaged women is of considerable importance and presents an opening 
for women who feel unrepresented within international security discourse to mobilise around. 
Given the history of Security Council resolution 1325 as primarily functioning as a tool 
which local women’s groups use to challenge and speak to national governments it might be 
expected that the incorporation and recognition that different women will have different 
needs in post-conflict communities will be mobilised strategically by women’s organisations 
in the future. Second, resolution 2122 indicates the Security Council itself as a site where 
gendered assumptions need to be challenged. In paragraph 15, resolution 2122 calls for an 
‘implementation shift’ in the Council’s work. Again, this is only a small part of a resolution 
that otherwise reiterates many of the provisions seen in earlier resolutions and, yet, also 
implicitly acknowledges a problem with the Security Council imposing gender perspectives 
on post-conflict communities and not reflecting on the gendered contours of its own work. 
Indeed, the paragraph 15 joins paragraph 7(a) of Security Council resolution 2122 as a 
potential challenge to gender essentialism that assumes problematic gender norms as 
elsewhere or to be received by poor, disadvantaged and conflict societies and not a 
component of international and/ or powerful states structures. 
Despite these two significant developments within resolution 2122, like the six resolutions 
before, 2122 does continue to address gender through a focus on women that assumes men as 
the existing participants and as a unitary group, denying the exclusion of some men and 
denying the over representation of men in decision-making structures as a significant 
problem. This happens in two ways. First, all of the resolutions speak about gender 
perspectives, gender equality, gender mainstreaming and gender balance and yet when this is 
translated to strategies for action the focus is on increasing the numbers of women. Not only 
are the diversity of women’s needs and experiences eradicated from the resolutions but 
women’s existing contributions to peace and security – locally, regionally and internationally 
– are rendered as doubly invisible and unimportant often because they are located outside of 
formal decision-making arenas. The gendered division of labour that is present in peace and 
security work, just as in other industries and spaces of work and expertise, is reinforced rather 
than challenged by this approach. That is, women’s existing work on security is rendered as 
peace work or relegated to informal spaces which are not recognised as working alongside 
and in partnership with formal decision making institutions. The long history of women’s 
mobilisation for peace across conflict spaces is not acknowledged as security work or as a 
form of participation in manner that is deeply gendered in terms of the types of work and 
participation that are acknowledged as mattering. Second, men’s over representation on 
decision-making bodies is never articulated as the actual problem, when this happens the 
diversity of men’s experience is also rendered invisible and the intersection of gender and 
other vectors of power that sustains privilege remains unexamined. 
In sum, the first seven resolutions on women, peace and security present a kaleidoscope view 
on participation: fragments across the resolutions demonstrate a commitment within the 
women, peace and security architecture to expanding women’s participation and consultation 
with women’s groups, primarily at the local and national level. This in part reflects the 
constraints of the work of the Security Council itself which, in developing a corpus of soft 
law resolutions of a thematic nature such as the eight resolutions on women, peace and 
security, cannot compel states to act in a specific way. Furthermore, the processes through 
which consensus on the Security Council is achieved, through negotiation and compromise 
can result in wording and framings that at best reflect what it was possible to agree on at the 
time. The key spaces where the Security Council can influence and direct processes, other 
than within its own institutional structures, are within peacekeeping and peacebuilding 
missions in the field. As a result, the imposition and requirement for change with regard to 
women’s participation has most often occurred via the expectation that post-conflict states 
use gender equality measures as an element of the evidence to be provided to demonstrate 
compliance with rule of law expectations. The consequence is gender perspectives and 
gender concerns are not directed at peace time states or at international institutions, but 
transplanted to post-conflict states only. This is despite the women, peace and security 
framework, since Resolution 1889, requiring National Action Plans from all states therefore 
engaging states that are both experiencing conflict and experiencing relative peace. The 
National Action Plans show that many states have heeded and incorporated a response with 
regard to the women, peace and security framework, however the main effects (for example, 
imposition of indicators on legal, economic and security sector reforms) still remain with 
regard to the law and regulation of conflict and post-conflict states. 
It is not the Security Council’s role to impose measures on peacetime states, except in 
relation to the maintenance of international peace and security, so if we recognise gendered 
forms of participation as global (rather than only in relation to conflict) then questions 
emerge as to whether the Security Council is the appropriate space for pursuing 
transformative change. Nevertheless, one of the advances the women, peace and security has 
established in the work of the Security Council has been recognition that the distinction 
between peacetime and conflict states is arbitrary; peacetime states influence and are 
influenced by state and non-state violence. The requirement for all states to draft and 
implement National Action Plans that has been a component of the women, peace and 
security framework since resolution 1889 demonstrates the necessity for women’s security to 
be understood through the security institutions of all states, whether understood as 
experiencing peace, conflict or post-conflict. For the most part the framework centres on 
directives for states experiencing conflict and post-conflict and these remain soft law 
obligations with no binding enforcement mechanisms. The manner in which authority and 
legitimacy around who acts and who is the recipient of collective security agendas, including 
the women, peace and security agenda, in this way largely reinforces a division between 
states that influence, create and mobilise the normative agenda to inform collective security 
and states which are the recipients of those norms. 
Before drawing conclusions about the approach to women, peace and security, the following 
section takes a detailed look at the provisions developed and incorporated into the eighth 
resolution on women, peace and security, resolution 2242. In doing so I review how the 
above models are continued and transformed, with specific attention to the continual risks of 
using the Security Council as a space for pursuing women’s rights and feminist agendas. I 
also reflect on the complicity of the Security Council in militarisation over peace projects, so 
as to consider whether a turn to the participation requirements of the framework further 
demonstrates the co-optation of feminist projects within the global order. Finally, I address 
the recurrent civilisation tropes that play out in the structuring of whose contributions matter 
and in terms of what forms women’s participation is envisaged taking. Ultimately, I argue the 
risks of co-optation raise outweigh the possible gains but that the existing resolutions might 
still be used by feminist actors via strategic misreadings and focus on the key advances in 
resolution 2242, in particular. 
Security Council Resolution 2242 
 
Security Council resolution, issued October 13th 2015, was drafted as a response to the High 
Level review of resolution 1325 undertaken by Radhika Coomaraswamy.27 The High Level 
Report sought to take stock of the gains and achievements of the fifteen years after resolution 
1325 to produce a forward looking eighth resolution on women, peace and security. Security 
Council resolution 2242 draws on the academic, activist, policy and institutional tools that 
have emerged around the prior seven resolutions and, not surprisingly, therefore holds 
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considerable hope in terms of the continued refinement of the existing women, peace and 
security agenda. 
Resolution 2242 and participation 
 
The key transformations to the women, peace and security framework within Security 
Council resolution 2242 can be summarised as follows. In paragraph 5(b), the resolution 
requires that all country-specific agendas take into account gender considerations and the 
rights of women, including through consultations with local women’s groups (emphasis 
added). The requirement, in paragraph 7, that gender analysis and technical expertise is 
included in all stages of peacekeeping missions, mandates, implementation, review and 
drawdown – including the doubling of the numbers of women in peacekeeping operations. In 
paragraphs 11 and 12, the resolution calls for the integration of the women, peace and 
security agenda into counter-terrorism strategies. In addition, the language that resolution 
2242 appears to be sensitive to the language of women’s rights – something that has only 
been a peripheral concern of prior resolutions. 
Importantly for this analysis, the language of women’s participation and consultation in 
resolution 2242 is untied from additional ‘women’s issues’, such that the resolution 
articulates women’s increased participation as a self-evident requirement: that need not be 
justified due to any specific experience of women. While this is a small change it is important 
that women’s participation is regarded as a self-evident claim that need not be justified by 
claims to greater effectiveness of decision-making bodies, the different skills women are 
supposed to add to decision-making bodies or the expectation that women’s issues can only 
be addressed if women are participants. Consequently, similar to Security Council resolution 
2122, the 2015 resolution considerably expands features of earlier resolutions even in the 
paragraphs that reiterate earlier paragraphs. For example, paragraph one, which starts with 
the language of previous resolutions, including resolution 1325, calling for the expansion of 
the representation of women in all levels of decision-making, goes further through 
recognising the need for resourcing from member states to support training for women and to 
develop women’s ‘meaningful inclusion in negotiating party’s delegations to peace talks’. 
This develops the requirement of participation to State investment in women’s training and 
the creation of processes to ensure this is transformative and accessible. Paragraph one of 
resolution 2242 also identifies the need for meaningful participation of civil society at 
regional and international levels, potentially picking up on the gaps in application of the 
original paragraph one in resolution 1325 where outcomes have been largely based within 
national spaces. Finally, paragraph one concludes by identifying the need for ‘facilitating 
cross representation of civil society representatives’, suggesting that, as with resolution 2122 
before it, the Security Council’s approach has begun to appreciate and incorporate attention 
to the diversity of women’s needs and experiences, and possibly the diversity of gendered 
experiences given that paragraph one speaks of civil society rather than women’s 
organisations / groups. Again, while this might seem to be a minor adjustment in the 
language deployed by the Security Council for women who have found their differences 
eradicated by the failure to address difference in the women, peace and security framework 
this is a change in language that women’s groups should instrumentalise and ensure to use in 
their interactions with state actors and institutions. 
Additional differences within this resolution are found in paragraph seven which requires 
‘women’s needs and gender perspectives’ to inform all aspects of peacekeeping operations. 
This subtle language shift where ‘women’s needs’ are required to be understood rather than 
woman as being consulted and is quite important, as it signals the potential for diverse 
women’s needs to be considered and for diverse voices to represent women’s needs. In 
addition, the term gender perspectives in this paragraph – although never defined by the 
international community – is closer to an acknowledgement of feminist approaches as being 
relevant. That is, gender perspectives might be articulated regardless of the representation of 
gender by any individual or group of individuals, allowing a shift toward understanding 
gender as a normative ordering rather than a description of men and women. 
In paragraph eight the Security Council articulates a commitment to appointment of women 
in senior UN posts, including with cross-geographical representation, again marking a 
significant shift in the Security Council’s perception of participation as this identifies the UN 
as also functioning to reproduce a gendered space of expertise that requires specific and 
conscious interventions to disrupt and transform. The inclusion of a requirement of cross- 
regional representation, while not recognising women’s diversity within communities let 
alone within regions, is also an improvement on the earlier, formal equality agenda of the 
women, peace and security framework. 
Finally, in paragraph five, the Security Council further develops the implementation shift 
articulated in resolution 2122 and reflects inward on Council processes so as to ‘recognize the 
need for greater integration of resolution 1325 in its own work’. However, the Security 
Council then extends this to include the need for consultation processes and all situations on 
the Security Council agenda should ‘take into account gender considerations and the rights of 
women, including through consultations with local and international women’s groups’.28 This 
is a significant development beyond the representative participation articulated within 
resolution 1325, the protective participation model found in the resolutions on conflict related 
violence and the modest move toward substantive participation in resolution 1889 or 2122. 
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In terms of protective protection, predominantly articulated in the conflict related sexual 
violence resolutions, this approach is not found in Security Council resolution 2242. Instead, 
in paragraph eight the resolution calls for a doubling of the number of women in 
peacekeeping operations while separately, in paragraphs nine and ten, calls for stronger 
mechanisms to investigate sexual exploitation and abuse, enhance pre-deployment training 
and peacekeeper accountability. The separation of these two agendas, although placed 
consecutively within the resolution, indicates an important step away from the protective 
participation of the earlier resolutions. Additionally, paragraph 14 adds a need for the 
strengthening of access to justice for women in post conflict communities with a specific 
requirement that this be established in relation to challenging impunity for conflict related 
sexual violence and, importantly, gender-based violence. Again, this considerably broadens 
the scope of the women, peace and security framework through recognition of the importance 
of access to justice and the framing of sexual violence as a subset of gender-based violence. 
Resolution 2242 and Countering Terrorism 
 
Despite the advances with regard to how participation is articulated in resolution 2242, this 
appears to come at a significant cost. In paragraphs 11 through to 13 the women, peace and 
security framework is linked to the Security Council’s approach to counter-terrorism. 
Paragraph 11, calls for the integration of the women, peace and security framework into 
counter terrorism and countering violent extremism strategies within the work of the Security 
Council and the Counter Terrorism Committee (established via resolution 1373). Paragraph 
12 calls for research into the radicalisation of women as well as research into the impact of 
counter terrorism on women’s rights. Paragraph 13 links women’s participation as necessary 
within counter-terrorism strategies within the UN and urges both member states and the UN 
system ‘to ensure the participation and leadership of women and women’s organisations in 
developing strategies to counter terrorism and violent extremism’.29  During the meeting of 
the Security Council on resolution 2242, the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon stated: ‘[a]t 
a time when armed extremist groups place the subordination of women at the top of their 
agenda, we must place women’s leadership and the protection of women’s rights at the top of 
ours’.30 While the linkage of the two agendas need not be a negative one, in relation to 
participation one consequence is, within paragraph 13, the focus on women’s participation, 
leadership and empowerment as a tool to counter terrorism. Subsequent debates and 
documents within the Security Council, for example the Open Debate on conflict related 
sexual violence in June 2016, shows how quickly the language of countering terrorism and 
violent extremism has been absorbed into the women, peace and security apparatus. This 
significantly adapts the prior focus of women, peace and security work and rather than 
aligning two arenas of collective security work there is a significant risk of the women, peace 
and security agenda being co-opted into the civilising tropes that surround the countering 
terrorism and violent extremism work. 
In the June 2016 the Secretary-General’s report on conflict-related sexual violence,31 
establishes the link between combatting terrorism and violent extremism and conflict-related 
sexual violence (CRSV) from the outset of the report, indicating in paragraph one: 
The Council’s recognition of sexual violence as both a tactic of war and tactic terrorism 
(resolution 2242 (2015)) affirms that conflict-resolution and counter-terrorism 
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strategies can no longer be decoupled from efforts to protect and empower women and 
girls and to combat conflict-related sexual violence.32 
The co-joining of the women, peace and security framework with the elaboration of the 
agenda for the prevention and prosecution of conflict-related sexual violence responds to, in 
particular, the specific violence on Da’esh in Syria and Iraq and of Boko Haram in Nigeria, 
where sexual violence has been integral to a policy of terror against local communities. The 
Secretary-General’s Report also documents non-state groups believed to be responsible for 
widespread and/ or systematic sexual violence in other conflict spaces and acknowledges the 
ongoing problems of sexual exploitation and abuse perpetrated by UN peacekeepers. 
Ní Aoláin provides an analysis of the convergence of the two collective security projects – 
women, peace and security and countering terrorism and violent extremism – to conclude: 
The superficial inclusion of references to women in the context of addressing terrorism 
and advancing counterterrorism strategies should not be read as a form of meaningful 
intersection between the Women, Peace and Security agenda and by now well- 
established post 9/11 international security regimes.33 
Ultimately the shift to integrate the women, peace and security agenda into the counter- 
terrorism and countering of violent extremism raises a series of concerns and questions about 
the role of the Security Council in developing women, peace and security. In particular, the 
use of violence, both through the Security Council and outside of the collective security 
apparatus to counter terror, whether as targeted strikes on the territory of other states or as 
military air strikes in the name of humanitarianism, should be of deep concern to feminist 
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actors committed to alternative strategies for promoting security that are detached from the 
use of military violence. 
The long history of feminist peace activism, including the work of WILPF that instigated, 
drafted and promoted Security Council resolution 1325 in the first place, is at odds with 
policy that condones and uses military force as an enforcement mechanism. The anti-military 
and long-time peace activism of WILPF was edited out of the original draft of Security 
Council resolution 1325,34 yet the commitments of WILPF have lead the implementation 
strategies with respect to the resolution.35 The project of feminist peace activism has been 
integral to the slow, but sure, progressions around participation across the eight resolutions. 
That is, in pursuing and refining the participation components of the women, peace and 
security framework the potential for challenging existing decision-making processes, in the 
Security Council, in peace processes and in local and regional decision-making structures 
reflects a crucial component of feminist peace activism, where women’s existing 
contributions and potential contributions to peace and security can be cultivated, 
acknowledged and expanded. 
Of significant concern within international counter terrorism strategies is the continued use of 
drone strikes against terrorist actors. The secrecy and failures with respect to consultation 
with any other actors, including the Security Council, over the decision to use unmanned 
armed vehicles by the US and its allies, to target terrorist actors, suggests what the Security 
Council gives in 2242 in the name of enhanced participation of women it takes away in 
paragraphs 11-13 where women, peace and security becomes a tool in countering terrorism 
and violence extremism. The US has previously relied on the Security Council’s targeted 
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sanctions regimes against terrorist actors as justification for targeted strikes through the use 
of drone technology.36 In this context, the pursuit of understanding the ‘the drivers of 
radicalization for women’ within 2242 and the need for women’s organisations to assist in 
countering terrorism and violent extremism co-opts the women, peace and security 
framework into the larger countering terrorism violence of powerful states. In the subsequent 
Security Council resolution 2368 (20th July 2017), on threats to international security caused 
by terrorist acts, the Security Council makes a singular oblique reference to the women, peace 
and security developments, in paragraph 15, and ‘reaffirms its intention to consider targeted 
sanctions for individuals and entities associated with ISIL or Al-Qaida involved in trafficking 
in persons in areas affected by armed conflict and in sexual violence in conflict’.37 
Importantly, the entwining of the two agendas within the Council exists within the women, 
peace and security resolutions and not in the countering terrorism resolutions, suggesting a 
process of bringing counter terrorism thinking into the women, peace and security framework 
but not gender agendas into counter terrorism strategies. 
At the same time, civil society actors working on women, peace and security that fail to 
comply with the countering terrorism and violent extremism risk funding and support, even 
when the goals of the organisation might be dislocated from terrorism as an issue. The 
women, peace and security gains are further minimised when the conflict related sexual 
violence work of the Security Council is also paired with anti-terrorism strategies as this 
returns to the model of protective participation and adds women as early warning signs for 
acts of terror while diminishing women’s roles as local participants and actors with relevant 
stakes, gains and knowledge in any security discourse per se, not for their specific 
vulnerability to conflict-related sexual violence. Furthermore, the integration of the 
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countering terrorism strategies into the women, peace and security agenda reinforces a 
retrograde production of gender as binary and preoccupied with saving women. The imagery 
of the Secretary-General’s Report on conflict-related sexual violence centres on women’s 
vulnerability in manner that directly undermines the production of participation provisions 
that avoid acknowledging the possibility of a position of recognising women’s existing 
capacity to facilitate transformative political spaces and further remove the structures from 
identifying and seeing male privilege and men’s overrepresentation in security discourse as 
misrepresentative and problematic in producing gender sensitive change. Instead, it seems 
likely that women’s security initiatives, be they centred on participation, health, education, 
diversity or preventing gender-based violence will increasingly have to demonstrate the 
nexus to anti-terror projects to receive attention, funding and access in the future. 
Finally, the very narrow space for understanding what constitutes terror and violent 
extremism under international law is lost as a space for feminist dialogue, interrogation and 
critique if that space is now co-opted into the women, peace and security agenda. An 
example, from the autonomous province of Bougainville in Papua New Guinea is illustrative. 
In Bougainville, the key security issues emerge from the rising sea levels and the ownership 
of the Panguna mine. Notwithstanding the many years of conflict Bougainville is still 
recovering and rebuilding from, it is rising sea levels, which directly affect the security of 
homes and townships on coastal regions, and the economic and environmental impact of 
planned re-opening of the Panguna mine that are a direct threat to Bougainville livelihoods. It 
is not really possible to re-imagine either of these issues in the language of countering – 
terrorism, although both issues have important gendered dimensions that would benefit, in 
particular, from attention to the capacity for ensuring women’s participation in decision- 
making.38  As the international framework moves toward the coupling of countering terrorism 
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discourses with women, peace and security initiatives, this raises important questions with 
regard to how Bougainville women ensure that their security initiatives and concerns are 
given space and meaning. For feminist scholars, strategies beyond liberal/ radical feminisms 
are required; so as to listen to those on the peripheries with the goal of transforming feminist 
thinking and action. Previously Bougainville has also suffered from its status as an 
autonomous province within the state of Papua New Guinea, however as Bougainville moves 
toward statehood/ independence (with a referendum on the matter now overdue) the capacity 
of the Bougainville government to provide security for its people will require focus on 
regional initiatives around re-location for those that are at risk of losing their homes due to 
rising sea levels and mechanisms to ensure economically powerful non-state actors are not 
able to use the mine as a source of wealth that depletes the stability of Bougainville citizens. 
The gender dimensions of these two security threats are underscored by the local gender 
structures which place women as the primary landowners, meaning the loss of livelihoods 
and land through either rising sea levels or multi-national enterprise greed in accessing the 
mine must be agreed with women as participants in any decision-making structures. 
However, gender structures within Bougainville also suffer from the legacy of international 
interventions: in particular the period of mandate and subsequent trusteeship status under 
international law. The possibilities for a nuanced understanding of gender, drawn from local 
perceptions, within the women, peace and security framework seems more remote than ever 
when terrorism, and anti-terror strategies, looks set to now dominate the next generation of 
resolutions on women, peace and security. Feminisms thoughtful of the complexity of diverse 
feminist methods might, instead, be attentive of ‘how to recognise a simultaneity of different 
histories while not subsuming them into a commensurable spatial and temporal moment of 
encounter’.39  The possibility of translating this into legal and political strategies in relation to 
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engagements with international institutions, such as the Security Council, would start with 
listening to those in post-conflict communities to understand gender and peace as 
mechanisms for change that are not driven by Western feminist perceptions of gender or 
peace. 
Feminist Spaces beyond Resolution 2242 
 
Security Council resolution 2242 undoubtedly recognises some of the existing critiques of the 
prior women, peace and security: pushing the framework to be responsive to women’s 
diversity, to the need for women’s participation to be a self-evident good rather than 
premised on protection discourse and gender perspectives to be about power structures, 
including recognising the Security Council itself as reproducing and producing gendered 
norms. The sustained feminist work, via the work of WILPF and UN Women, that produced 
the progressions on participation across the eight resolutions from resolution 1325 to 
resolution 2242 are a progress that contain all kinds of promises in terms of how international 
institutions can be made to take note, how ‘footholds’40 can be transformed into ledges of 
opportunity and how transnational feminist projects can mobilise a slow, yet unwavering, 
commitment to change in the most gendered of institutions.41 However, slow progress is 
indicative of the small gains produced and the ledge of opportunity risks, always, being re- 
constructed by the institution’s own agendas.42 The emergence of the countering terrorism 
provisions in paragraphs 11 to 13 of resolution 2242 undertakes precisely this type of 
reconstructive work – evidenced eight months later in the annual discussions on conflict 
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related sexual violence in the Security Council which start with countering terrorism 
provisions and centre this in the CRSV discourse. 
In this section I wish to propose an alternative future for resolution 2242. In this alternative 
future for resolution 2242 a road map for implementation centres on instrumentalising 
politically responsible listening to peripheral subjects, as a form of postcolonial feminism, 
alongside an intersectional account of power - and how power sustains itself within 
institutions. I argue that rather than accepting the co-optation of gender law reform or 
withdrawing from the spaces of global governance, continued feminist mis-readings of the 
resolutions, grounded in feminist methodologies, offers as alternative future for the 
resolutions. This taps into the legacy of Security Council resolution 1325 as produced and 
mobilised through the work of women’s and feminist NGOs, working transnationally and 
across networks to render the resolution a living legal document. Notwithstanding the 
criticisms that have been levelled at Security Council resolution 1325, its value remains in the 
entrenched role it plays in activist communities. To counteract the reduction of feminist 
understanding that institutional texts continually favour it is crucial that attention to the 
mobilisation and life of resolution 2242 be centred on the non-institutional potential, to 
ultimately influence the institutions it speaks to. However, I would also add that it might also 
be time to consider abandonment of the women, peace and security framework: in favour of a 
feminist strategies that would be situated as questioning the Council’s approach to counter- 
terrorism,43 rather than the furthering of the project of incorporation into the United Nations 
security architecture. 
To consider what types of changes are required to shift to a project of politically responsible 
listening,44 rather than the current liberal/ radical feminist approach of the women, peace and 
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security resolutions, I draw on Otto’s description of her experience as an Expert Panellist at 
the Asia-Pacific Regional Women’s Hearing on Gender-Based Violence in Conflict, held 10- 
11 October 2012, in Phnom Penh, Cambodia. Otto describes the politics of listening as 
avoiding ‘engaging in a process of consumption that confirms my own humanity, rather than 
acting on a politics of listening that looks to realising justice in and beyond the law’.45 As 
such, Otto speaks of requiring strategies ‘to draw those of us listening . . . directly into the 
frame of responsibility’.46 In terms of the women, peace and security framework this would 
involve asking about the complicity of the Security Council, and its member states, in the 
histories of gendered violence and a postcolonial feminist attention to the legacies of 
colonialism in informing the contours of international law. A failure to acknowledge the 
legacy of colonialisms on the contours of global governance, within feminist and gender 
projects, risks the co-optation of gender as a tool for dominance and civilising.47 
I link Otto’s reflections on how we listen and how we step ‘outside the law to ask structural 
questions about the exclusionary effects of the law and whose interests this serves’48 with 
Kapur’s work on the peripheral subject where she implores feminist scholars working on 
violence against women in the global order to centre the peripheral subject as a normative 
force in the examination of law. While, for Kapur, the peripheral subject is a tool for 
recognising different subjectivities and to ‘counter the fictitious homogeneity and sisterhood 
created through the victim subject’.49 I use the term peripheral literally in application to the 
study of gender and security to examine which voices are located in the peripheries of global 
affairs and are rendered peripheral to the work of women, peace and security dialogues 
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despite their connection to the policies and outcomes at the local level. To ask how 
international law and policy is received by women within conflict and post conflict 
communities, and how they would proceed, change and challenge those laws and policies is 
not only to hear peripheral subjects through her participation but also to exercise listening in 
line with Otto’s ideas on the nexus between listening and political responsibility. In this 
sense, ‘the importance of numerous and varied feminist ideas and feminist struggles’50 
remains central to my understanding of feminist methods that regards feminist knowledge 
production within peripheral spaces as important as, sometimes more important than, those 
that have the ear of the Security Council. 
If it is to be deployed as transformative tool, Security Resolution 2242 needs to be understood 
as holding the potential to place those traditionally regarded as peripheral subjects and 
distanced from the main events of international affairs as the vital and missing voices needed 
for creating security strategies that are transformative from a gender perspective. For Kapur: 
... it is important to recognise and center the peripheral subject and her multiple 
historically, culturally and socially determined subjectivities instead of falling back on 
universalised assumptions about women’s realities and their subject position.51 
Kapur acknowledges the production of victim subjects via women’s human rights strategies 
within the international arena. It is important to be mindful of the normative structures on 
gender produced by international institutions that continually reproduce gendered 
subjectivities that are invested with the gender expectations of the institution. At the same 
time, feminist projects must work to underdo the gender expectations of international 
institutions through the processes through which gender outputs are deployed in local, 
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regional and transnational spaces. As such, the references in Security Council resolution 2122 
that require the Security Council to apply a gender analysis to its own work are important 
tools for challenging the all too easy production of victim subjects and saving narratives in 
the women, peace and security framework. These approaches, at once casting women as 
primarily vulnerable to sexual violence in armed conflict, and thus a victim, and at the same 
time constructing elite women as best placed to save women in conflict communities, ignore 
the potential contributions to political and legal arrangements from the women who is 
regarded as a victim. The peripheral subject, and her understanding of the interlocking of 
gender and race privilege, then becomes a site of knowledge to begin feminist conversations 
on how to dismantle ‘universal assumptions about women’s realities’.52 The quest to shift to 
cross-regional approaches, with greater civil society participation and appropriate funding for 
training is integral to this approach. Nevertheless, there is still a necessity to arrest top down 
processes that situate gender experts as separate to gendered victim. The peripheral subject is 
not engaged to be saved but rather to inform the contours of responses. 
In addition, attention to the legacy of coloniality must be placed within the centre of feminist 
strategies. In the context of counter-terrorism the Secretary-General’s remark on the thinking 
behind resolution 2242 underscore a continued project of us and them / civilised and 
uncivilised. The mobilisation of women’s rights as a mechanism to bolster Western and 
powerful state counter terrorism strategies, which nearly always involve force and tend to 
replicate colonial histories of force and intervention, needs to be challenged via gender 
strategies rather than reinforced through them. A failure to attend to, or a failure to highlight 
and address, the imperial dimensions and colonial legacies played out in counter-terrorism 
strategies reproduces rather than reduces terrorism and violent extremism. Security Council 
resolution 2242 contains no reflection on the continued impact of past violence meted out on 
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states through the foreign policies of the five permanent members of the Security Council, 
however a feminist project mindful of this has the potential to be transformative for the lives 
of those at greatest risk in conflict communities and to disrupt the continued ruptures to 
transnational feminisms borne of a failure of elite women’s narrow rendering of women’s 
lives. 
Finally, there is a need to address embodied subjectivity within the Security Council 
resolutions to acknowledge how the resolutions construct gendered bodies in times of conflict 
and contribute to the racialized bodies associated with anti-terrorism discourse. The anti- 
terrorism paragraphs in Security Council resolution 2242 articulate gender as shorthand for 
women and with a clear articulation of good (women’s organisations assisting the Security 
Council) and bad (women at risk of radicalisation) that is dangerously simplistic in its 
understanding of subjectivities and raises questions about the capacity of a warmongering 
institution, such as the Security Council, as the appropriate site for developing a feminist 
agenda.53 Ultimately the view of terrorism within the resolutions is reminiscent of former US 
President George Bush’s refrain: ‘You are either with us or against’.54 The good/bad binary 
within resolution 2242 on countering terror versus women at risk of radicalisation is already 
being deployed by states to demarcate some bodies as dangerous and as not belonging in 
powerful Western states such as the UK.55 A feminist analysis and engagement, both with 
counter-terrorism and the Security Council, must push back against this construction of some 
bodies as racialized and dangerous through demands for recognition of the role of states in 
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the perpetuation of terror and the complicity of past state practices in the rise of specific 
terrorist groups. 
Security Council resolution 2242 is an important, perhaps the most important, Security 
Council resolution on women, peace and security. However, Resolution 2242 also chimes 
louder than the seven previous resolutions with regard to the risks of engagement with an 
institution with a mandate to authorise the use of force and highlights unequivocally how the 
agenda of the Council dictates the contours of the women, peace and security framework. A 
feminist approach to security, in contrast, has a legacy of anti-militarisation and listening to 
peripheral subjects that might be drawn on to produce a project of peace, and constructive 
misreadings and re-orientating of the women, peace and security framework rather than the 
current divisive and destructive model. 
